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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Mr. Ortiz was charged with possession of methamphetamine after officers found
methamphetamine on the floorboard of the passenger compartment of the car he was
driving. The methamphetamine was collected, along with other debris on the floor, and
sent to the lab for testing. At trial, Rachel Cutler, a forensic scientist, testified that when
she weighed the substance she did not separate the debris from the methamphetamine,
stating that it was not necessary as weight was not an issue in this case.
Following her testimony, the State was allowed to introduce evidence regarding
the typical amount of methamphetamine used at one time, how methamphetamine is
usually packaged on the street, and the cost of one dose, over the objection of defense
counsel.

The State used this information to argue that Mr. Ortiz knew the

methamphetamine was there because it was a significant amount of the drug. During
its closing arguments, the State also argued that the forensic scientist testified that the
amount of methamphetamine at issue was over 3.5 grams, although she never testified
to how much the methamphetamine weighed versus the debris.
Mr. Ortiz contends the district court erred when it allowed the State to elicit
testimony regarding how methamphetamine is used, packaged, and sold because this
information was more prejudicial than probative in this case. Mr. Ortiz also asserts that
the prosecutor violated his right to a fair trial when he committed misconduct by
impermissibly misrepresenting the testimony of Rachel Cutler, resulting in fundamental
error. Finally, he contends the cumulative effect of these errors deprived him of his right
to a fair trial, resulting in cumulative error.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedinas
Mr. Ortiz was pulled over by Officer Wiggins after Mr. Ortiz pulled out from what
the officer believed was a known drug house. (Trial Tr., p.82, Ls.3-8, p.84, Ls.2-13.)
According to Officer Wiggins, he paced Mr. Ortiz going over the speed limit. (Trial
Tr., p.85 L . l l

- p.87, L.13.) While Officer Wiggins was writing a citation due to Mr. Ortiz

failing to provide insurance, he called Officer Case, the canine handler, to respond to
the scene and have his canine perform a free air sniff around the vehicle.

(Trial

Tr., p.89, Ls.1-25.) After Officer Case deployed his dog, the dog indicated on the door
handle of the vehicle's front passenger side. (Trial Tr., p.166, L.22

- p.168,

L.19.)

Mr. Ortiz was then asked to get out of the vehicle, and because his demeanor was
agitated, Officer Case patted him down for weapons. (Trial Tr., p.168, L.22 - p.769,
L.23.)

While patting Mr. Ortiz down, Officer Case found what he believed was a

methamphetamine pipe. (Trial Tr., p.170, Ls.1-20.) Mr. Ortiz was then placed under
arrest for possession of paraphernalia. (Trial Tr., p.93, Ls.7-9.) Officer Wiggins then
continued to search

Mr. Ortiz and discovered $3,000 in cash in one of Mr. Ortiz'

pockets. (Trial Tr., p.93, Ls.10-21.)
Officer Wiggins subsequently also searched Mr. Oritz' car.

(Trial Tr., p.94,

L.12 - p.95, L.6.) When he opened up the passenger side door of the Dodge Stratus,
he saw a white crystal substance on the floorboard, just in front of the passenger seat
area. (Trial Tr., p.94, L.12 - p.95, L.6.) Officer Wiggins suspected that this substance
was methamphetamine so he contacted Ken Mencl, a narcotics investigator, and asked
him to respond to the scene. (Trial Tr., p.96, Ls.12-20.) Investigator Mencl collected
the majority of the crystals, scrapping up as much of the crystals as he could with a card

and placing them in a plastic bag, and turned them over to Officer Wiggins. (Trial
Tr., p.102, Ls.14-18, p.203, Ls.3-8, p.204, L.24 - p.205, L.2.) Although the substance
was not sticking to the carpet, it was mashed down into the carpet and required a
significant amount of effort to try to gather it up. (Trial Tr., p.204, Ls.14-21.) Officer
Wiggins collected the remainder of what he could and later placed it into evidence.
(Trial Tr., p.102, Ls.19-23.) Once the vehicle was taken into custody, Investigator Mencl
used a vacuum cleaner with a filter to try to vacuum any remaining evidence and placed
this filter into evidence as well. (Trial Tr., p.205, Ls.3-22.) There was also some other
debris that was collected with the crystals when they were gathered up by the officers.
(Trial Tr., p.102, Ls.11-13.)
collected.

A plastic baggie was also found in the vehicle and

(Trial Tr., p.206, Ls.11-17.)

The plastic bag and filter of suspected

methamphetamine were sent to the State lab for testing. (Trail Tr., p.135, L.2

- p.139,

L.14; State's Exhibit 1.)
Mr. Ortiz was ultimately charged by Information with possession of a controlled
substance, and an enhancement for this being his second offense of the Uniform
Controlled Substance Act. (R., pp.57-60.) The case eventually proceeded to trial.
(R., pp.174-76.)
At trial, Rachel Cutler, a forensic scientist with the State Police Forensic Services
testified that she tested the evidence in State's Exhibit 1. (Trial Tr., p.128, L.7
L.ll.)

- p.152,

She explained that the evidence she received contained a tied plastic baggie

with crystals and various debris. (Trial Tr., p.135, Ls.2-3.) When she weighed the
1 grams were used to test the
substance and debris it weighed 3.82 grams total. .I
substance, leaving 3.71 grams, which were repackaged. (Trial Tr., p.139, L.24 - p.140,

L.5.) Ms. Culter testified that from the tests she performed she was able to identify the
substance as methamphetamine. (Trial Tr., p.139, Ls.10-14.)
During her testimony, Ms. Cutler also testified that she was not able to determine
how much of the 3.82 grams was methamphetamine and how much was debris,
explaining that it was too time consuming to separate the debris from the crystals and
that she did not believe doing so was necessary in this case.

(Trial Tr., p.142,

Ls.10-23.) She explained that because she was not looking at a trafficking quantity, and
because the debris was not substantial enough to "greatly affect" her weight, she chose
not to remove it. (Trial Tr., p.142, Ls.15-23.)
Later, when the State began asking Officer Mencl about quantities of
methamphetamine and how much is usually used at one time, the defense objected to
this line of questioning. (Trial Tr., p.209, L.8

- p.211, L.9.)

Counsel for Mr. Ortiz argued

that this testimony was more prejudicial than probative, noting that in this case the
methamphetamine was not separated from the debris and that the State had already
taken pains to elicit answers that the amount of methamphetamine was not a concern in
this case. (Trial Tr., p.210, L.8 - p.212, L.24.) The district court overruled the objection
and allowed the testimony to continue stating the quantity of drugs was relevant to show
an inference that Mr. Ortiz had knowledge of their presence and that it was not unduly
prejudicial to Mr. Ortiz. (Trial Tr., p.213, L.4 - p.214, L.11.) Officer Mencl then testified
that "one hit" of methamphetamine is usually between and eighth and a quarter of a
gram, and that an eighth of a gram would sell for approximately $25, a quarter of a gram
would sell for about $50, and a gram would sell for about $100. (Trial Tr., p.214,
L.20

- p.215, L.4.)

He also testified that it is not very common for people to purchase

more than one, two, maybe three hits at a time, and that a gram usually lasts about
three to five hits. (Trial Tr., p.215, Ls.10-21.)
The State relied on this testimony throughout its arguments to the jury, arguing
that based on Investigator Mencl's testimony Mr. Ortiz had a significant amount of drugs
and that someone would not have this much drugs and not know it. (Trial Tr., p.254,
Ls.5-13, p.275, L.21 - p.276, 1.4.)

In his closing statements, the prosecutor aiso

argued "As the criminalist Rachel Cutler told you, that debris, as far as the weight of it
towards the total weight, was insignificant.

And so this basically was in the

neighborhood of three and a half grams plus weight full of methamphetamine." (Trial
Tr., p.253, L.25 - p.254, L.4.)
Mr. Ortiz was found guilty of possession of a controlled substance and pled guilty
to Part 11 of the Information alleging this was his second drug offense. (R., p.176.) He
was sentenced ten years, with two years fixed, and the district court retained jurisdiction
for 180 days. (R., pp.188-99.) Mr. Ortiz filed a timely Notice of Appeal from the district
court's Judgment of Conviction. (R., pp.200-02.)

Following the period of retained

jurisdiction, Mr. Ortiz' sentence was suspended and he was placed on probation for
three years. (Augmentation: Order Upon 180-Day Review ~earing.)'

'

A Motion to Augment the record with a copy of the Order Upon 180-Day Review
Hearing was filed with the Idaho Supreme Court on March 18, 2009. As of this writing
an Order has not been issued on this motion.

ISSUES
I

1.

Did the district court err allowing the State to introduce testimony regarding
typical methamphetamine use, packaging, and sales, because this testimony
was more prejudicial than it was probative?

2.

Did the State violate Mr. Ortiz' right to a fair trial, by committing prosecutorial
misconduct during closing arguments when he misrepresented Ms. Cutler's
testimony?

3.

Did the erroneous admission of prejudicial evidence and the prosecutor's
misconduct result in cumulative error depriving Mr. Ortiz of a fair trial?

I
I
I

ARGUMENT
I.
The District Court Erred By Allowina The State To lntroduce Testimony Reclardinq
Ty~icalMetham~hetamineUse, Packaqina, And Sales, Because This Testimony Was
More Preiudicial Than It Was Probative
A.

Introduction
The district court erred when it allowed the State to elicit testimony from

lnvestigator Mencl regarding the typical amount of methamphetamine used at one time,
how methamphetamine is usually packaged on the street, and the cost of one dose,
because the risk of prejudice from this information substantially outweighed the
probative value in this case. Moreover, that error cannot be harmless as it was used by
the State to support its argument that Mr. Ortiz had knowledge of the methamphetamine
found on the floor of his passenger compartment.

B.

The District Court Erred By Allowinq The State To lntroduce Evidence Reaardina
Tvpical Methamphetamine Use. Packaainq. And Sales, Because This Testimony
Was More Preiudicial Than It Was Probative
Mr. Ortiz contends that the district court should not have allowed the State to

question lnvestigator Mencl regarding typical methamphetamine use, packaging, and
sales, because the risk of prejudice from this testimony outweighed the probative value.
Under ldaho Rule of Evidence 403, the determination to admit or exclude relevant
evidence is made by the trial court by balancing the probative value of the evidence
against the dangers of unfair prejudice, distraction, confusion of the issues, and waste
of time. Masters v. Dewey, 109 ldaho 576, 579, 709 P.2d 149, 152 (Ct. App. 1985).
Therefore, once it is determined that the evidence is relevant and material as to an
issue of fact, the court must then determine whether the risk of prejudice to the

defendant from the admission of the evidence is outweighed by its probative value.
I.R.E. 403; State v. Enno, 119 ldaho 392, 807 P.2d 610 (1991).
The determination of whether the prejudicial effect of the evidence outweighs the
probative value is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Sfafe v. Eyfchison, 136 ldaho
210, 215, 30 P.3d 988, 993 (Ct. App. 2001). On appeal, to determine whether the
district court exercised its discretion, the appellate court conducts a multi-tiered inquiry,
looking at: (1) whether the district court correctly perceived the issue as a discretionary
one; (2) whether the lower court acted with the outer bounds of its discretion and
consistently with the applicable legal standards; and (3) whether the district court
reached its decision by an exercise of reason. Sfafe v. Hedger, 115 ldaho 598, 600, 68
P.2d 1331, 1333 (1989). Here, even though, as the defense admitted, the testimony in
question had some relevance, the district court abused its discretion when admitting the
evidence because the probative value of the testimony was outweighed by its prejudicial
effect because the evidence was unfairly prejudicial, misleading, and could easily
confuse the jury.
When

the

State

began

asking

Officer

Mencl about

quantities

of

methamphetamine and how much is usually used at one time, the defense objected to
the line of questioning. (Trial Tr., p.209, L.8 - p.211, L.9.) Counsel for Mr. Ortiz
explained that he was objecting to this line of questioning based on relevance arguing
that this was more prejudicial than probative. (Trail Tr., p.210, Ls.9-14.) He explained,
[TJhe state has gone to pains, especially with Rebecca Culter in
eliciting answers that the weight is not a concern here, that any amount is
against the law.. ..
And now the state wishes to go into how was it packaged, what's
an eight ball, how much value does it bring and into any number of
questions that can be asked regarding that issue, when that is not the

issue as to my client, since any amount can be an indicia of guilt and that
has already been shown.
(Trial Tr., p.219, Ls.14-25.) Counsel for Mr. Ortiz explained that there was "some
relevancy to the questioning;" however, the prejudice in going into this line of inquiry
when Mr. Ortiz was not charged with delivery, attempted delivery, trafficking, etc. where
weight and distribution would be relevant, outweighed the probative value of this
testimony. (Trial Tr., p.211, Ls.1-9.)
The State then explained that it was offering this testimony to demonstrate
Mr. Ortiz' knowledge stating, "this evidence is to rebut any inference that a person who
may have placed it there wouldn't have placed that amount of methamphetamine
accidentally." (Trial Tr., p.211, Ls.14-18.) The prosecutor explained further that this
evidence would go to whether it would be reasonable for anyone else to have lost that
amount of methamphetamine in the car without realizing it or intentionally placed such a
significant amount there and that, because the jury does not know anything about drug
culture. they are not going to understand this unless they are familiarized with the
standard amounts used. (Trial Tr., p.211, L.21 - p.212, L.9.)
The district court overruled the objection and allowed the testimony to continue
stating the quantity of drugs was "relevant to show by inference that that knowledge was
present." (Trial Tr., p.213, Ls.4-12.)

In addressing the prejudicial effect versus the

probative value of allowing the testimony in, the district court stated "[o]f course it's
prejudicial, but I don't find that it's unduly prejudicial under Rule 403." (Trial Tr., p.213,
Ls.10-20.) Officer Mencl then testified that "one hit" of methamphetamine is usually
between an eighth and a quarter of a gram, and that an eighth of a gram would sell for
approximately $25, a quarter of a gram would sell for about $50, and a gram would sell

for about $100. (Trial Tr., p.214, L.20 - p.215, L.4.) He also testified that it is not very
common for people to purchase more than one, two, maybe three hits at a time, and
that a gram usually lasts about three to five hits. (Trial Tr., p.215, Ls.10-21.)
However, this evidence should not have been allowed in because even if
relevant, there was a significant risk of prejudice by allowing the evidence in. The
appropriate test under I.R.E. 403 is not whether prejudicial evidence is unduly
prejudicial, but whether the risk of unfair prejudice substantially outweighs the probative
value. I.R.E. 403; Sfafe v. Spor, 134 ldaho 315, 319, 1 P.3d 816, 820 (Ct. App. 2000).
Therefore, the district court failed to apply the proper legal standard to its determination.
See id.

Furthermore, application of the proper standard reveals that the risk of unfair
prejudice outweighed any probative value the testimony may have had because the
actual weight of methamphetamine in this case was unknown. The ldaho Court of
Appeals has stated that "[tjhe greater the amount of a controlled substance found in a
defendant's possession, the greater the inference of knowledge and control." State v.
Groce, 133 ldaho 144, 152, 983 P.2d 217, 225 (Ct. App. 1999). However, in this case
evidence regarding the significance of the weight should not have been admitted
because the weight was not the exact weight of the methamphetamine but, rather, it
was the weight of the substance mixed with debris. During her testimony, Ms. Cutler
testified that she was not able to determine how much of the 3.82 grams was
methamphetamine and how much was debris.

(Trial Tr., p.142, Ls.10-23.)

She

explained that because the weight was not at issue in this case and because the debris
was not substantial enough to "greatly affect" the weight she chose not to remove it.

(Trial Tr., p.142, Ls.15-23.) Therefore, the weight of the methamphetamine specifically
is unknown; however, this line of questioning encourages the jury to proceed or assume
that the weight of everything in the baggie is the weight of the methamphetamine,
unduly prejudicing the defendant and confusing the jury.
Therefore, the district court erred in allowing the State to present testimony
regarding the typical amount of methamphetamine used at one time, how
methamphetamine is usually packaged on the street and the cost of one dose because
the prejudicial effect of this testimony outweighed any probative value it had.
C.

The Error In Admittina This Evidence Was Not Harmless
ldaho Criminal Rule 52 provides that, "any error, defect, irregularity, or variance

which does not affect substantial rights shall be disregarded." In State v. Seitter, 127
ldaho 356, 900 P.2d 1367 (1995), the ldaho Supreme Court stated for error to be
harmless, "'we must declare a belief, beyond a reasonable doubt, that there was no
reasonable possibility that [the] evidence complained of contributed to the conviction."'

Id. at 358, 900 P.2d at 1369. It cannot be said beyond a reasonable doubt that the
testimony admitted in this case was not harmless.
Here, the State used the testimony regarding the typical amount of
methamphetamine used at one time, how methamphetamine is usually packaged on the
street, and the cost of one dose, to argue that Mr. Ortiz had to have placed the
methamphetamine on the floor because no one would just leave this amount of
methamphetamine in someone's car. In his closing statements, the prosecutor argued
that as Investigator Mencl told the jury, a gram of methamphetamine goes for $100;
therefore, there was $350-$400 worth of methamphetamine. (Trial Tr., p.254, Ls.6-10.)

The prosecutor then asked, "is this the type of amount that someone would accidentally
leave there on the floorboards or is it an amount that was placed there for some
purpose?" (Trial Tr., p.254, Ls.5-13.)
Later in his rebuttal, the prosecutor again stated,
And so ask again whether it makes sense that someone would just
inadvertently spill and leave that amount of methamphetamine in that
particular car. Officer Mencl told you that kind of a single user amount
would be about one-sixteenth to on-eighth of a gram and you can do the
math. And if you go with one-sixteenth, that's going to come out to about
in excess of 50 uses. At one-eight its [sic] going to be around 27 to 30
uses.

-

(Trial Tr., p.275, L.21 p.276, L.4.)
Furthermore, the prosecutor acknowledged that this was a circumstantial case as
far as proving that Mr. Ortiz had knowledge of the substance. (Trial Tr., p.276, Ls.5-10.)
Therefore, the evidence presented regarding methamphetamine use, packaging and
sales went to the heart of the prosecutor's case and its use cannot be deemed
harmless.

The State Violated Mr. Ortiz' Riaht To A Fair Trial By Committinq Prosecutorial
Misconduct During Closing Arguments When He Misrepresented The Testimonv Of
Ms. Cutler
A.

Introduction
Mr. Ortiz asserts that the prosecutor violated his right to a fair trial, guaranteed by

the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, and Article

1, § 13 of the Idaho Constitution, when he impermissibly misrepresented the evidence
presented at trial during the testimony of Rachel Cutler. Furthermore, this misconduct
amounted to fundamental error and was not harmless.

B.

Fundamental Error Occurred In This Case When The State Misre~resentedThe
Testimonv Of The Forensic S~ecialist.Ms. Cutler. Reqardinq The Weiqht Of The
Methamphetamine In This Case
Although there was no objection to the prosecutor's comments during closing

arguments in this case, prosecutorial misconduct can be reviewed for fundamental error
when there has not been an objection made below. See State v. Field, 144 ldaho 559,
571, 165 P.3d 273,285 (2007); State v. Kuhn, 139 ldaho 710,715,85 P.3d 1109, 1114
(Ct. App. 2003). A fundamental error is one that "'so profoundly distorts the trial that it
produces manifest injustice and deprives the accused of his constitutional right to due
process."' State v. Christiansen, 144 ldaho 463, 470, 163 P.2d 1175, 1182 (2007)
(quoting State v. Sheahan, 139 ldaho 267, 281, 77 P.3d 956, 970 (2003); State v.
Mauro, 121 ldaho 178, 180, 824 P.2d 109, 111 (1991)). It has been defined as an error
which "goes to the foundation or basis of a defendant's rights or ...to the foundation of
the case or take[s] from the defendant a right which was essential to his defense and
which no court could or ought to permit him to waive." Id. (quoting State v. Bingham,
116 ldaho 415,423,776 P.2d 424,432 (1989)).
The ldaho Court of Appeals has held that "[p]rosecutorial misconduct rises to the
level of fundamental error wheh it is calculated to inflame the minds of the jurors and
arouse prejudice or passion against the defendant, or is so inflammatory that the jurors
may be influenced to determine guilt on factors outside the evidence." Kuhn, 139 ldaho
at 715, 85 P.3d at 1114. The prosecutor's actions or comments must be so egregious
or inflammatory that a curative jury instruction could not have remedied the misconduct.

Id. This reflects the rationale behind the rule, that even if the defendant had made a
timely objection to the inflammatory statements, the objection would not have cured the

inherent prejudice. Id. This also reflects the fact that the trial court itself possesses the
power to sua sponte intervene when prosecutorial misconduct is sufficiently egregious
and prejudicial. State v. Phillips, 144 ldaho 82, 88 n.2, 156 P.3d 583, 589 n.2 (Ct. App.
2007) (noting that "[tlhe trial courts of this state possess authority and are encouraged
to monitor the course of closing arguments, to sua sponte intervene as warranted, and
to impose remedies or sanctions as appropriate to protect an accused's right to a fair
I

trial"). Therefore, when reviewing a question of prosecutorial misconduct, the appellate
Court must first determine whether the complained about conduct was improper, then, if
I

so, whether the misconduct impinged on the defendant's right to a fair trial, or whether
the misconduct was harmless. Kuhn, 139 ldaho at 715, 85 P.3d at 1114.
In this case, the prosecutor committed misconduct in his closing argument when
he misrepresented Ms. Culter, the forensic specialist's testimony.

In his closing

statements the prosecutor argued "As the criminalist Rachel Cutler told you, that debris,
as far as the weight of it towards the total weight, was insignificant. And so this
basically was in the neighborhood of three and a half grams plus weight full of
methamphetamine." (Trial Tr., p.253, L.25 - p.254, L.4.) However, in her testimony,
Ms. Culter never testified that the weight of the methamphetamine by itself was
approximately the same as the weight including the debris or that it was "in the
neighborhood of three and a half grams weight full of methamphetamine."
During her testimony, Ms. Culter repeatedly testified that she could not determine
the weight of the methamphetamine versus the weight of the debris in this case. (Trial

1

Tr., p.128, L.7 - p.152, L.ll.) She explained that it was too time consuming to separate
the debris from the crystals and that she did not believe doing so was necessary in this

case. (Trial Tr., p.142, Ls.10-23.) She also explained that because she was not looking
at a trafficking quantity and because the debris was not substantial enough to "greatly
affect" her weight, she chose not to remove it. (Trial Tr., p.142, Ls.15-23.) Later she
did testify that by looking at the sample one could tell that the controlled substance
outweighed the debris. (Trial Tr., p.142, L.24 - p.143, L.13.) However, she also stated
she could not guess what percentage of the substance was methamphetamine
explaining,
We're not allowed to do any guessing in my field to determine the
percent, you would have to do something called quantitative analysis.
Idaho Code does not require knowing what percent the substance is, just
the presence thereof is illegal. So quantitative testing was not performed
in this case.
(Trial Tr., p.149, Ls.3-9.)
Finally, when questioned by the prosecutor regarding whether the debris was of
an insignificant weight, Ms. Cutler explained "I just noted that I didn't feel the debris was
substantially affecting my total weight." (Trial Tr., p.149, Ls.15-24.) The prosecutor
than asked if it was still her opinion that whatever debris was contained with the
methamphetamine would be insignificant, to which she responded affirmatively. (Trial
Tr., p.150, Ls.4-7.)
The Fourteenth Amendment due process clause's prohibition on knowingly using
false evidence to obtain a conviction, applies not only to entirely fabricated evidence,
but to arguments that misstate the evidence adduced at trial. See Miller v. Pate, 386

U.S. 1, 7 (1967); United States v. Fearns, 501 F.2d 486, 488-89 (7th Cir. 1974).
Although counsel for both sides are generally afforded considerable latitude in closing
arguments, and are entitled to discuss fully the evidence adduced at trial and inferences

that can be drawn from that evidence, it is improper for the prosecutor to misstate the
evidence. Phillips, 144 ldaho at 86, 156 P.3d at 587. Therefore, a prosecutor cannot
misrepresent or mischaracterize the evidence during his closing arguments. Id.
Here, taken in context with her earlier statements, Ms. Cutler's statement that the
debris was insignificant is not a statement that the weight is such a minuscule amount it
is insignificant, but that whatever the weight is, it is not significant to her results in this
case. Furthermore, during her testimony, it was never solicited what amount she would
consider insignificant or not substantially affecting the total weight. This, coupled with
the fact that Ms. Culter refused to give any estimate of what proportion was
methamphetamine and what proportion was debris, indicates that the state was
misrepresenting her testimony when he stated the weight of just the methamphetamine
in this case was over three and a half grams.
Therefore, the prosecutor committed misconduct when he misrepresented
Ms. Cutler's testimony regarding the amount of methamphetamine versus the amount of
debris in this case. and this misconduct should be reviewed for fundamental error.

C.

The State's Misconduct In This Case Is Not Harmless Error
Here it simply cannot be said, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the misconduct of

the prosecutor in this case did not contribute to Mr. Ortiz' conviction. Chapman v.
California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967); Sfafe v. Sharp, I01 ldaho 498, 507, 616 P.2d 1034,
1043 (1980). As argued above in Section I(C), and incorporated herein by reference,
the State heavily relied on the weight in question to demonstrate that Mr. Ortiz knew of
the methamphetamine's presence. This went to the heart of the only real element at
issue in this case, whether Mr. Ortiz "knowingly" possessed methamphetamine.

Therefore, the State's misrepresentations regarding Ms. Culter's testimony about the
weight of the evidence cannot be deemed harmless in this case

The Erroneous Admission Of Preiudicial Evidence And The Prosecutor's Misconduct
Resulted In Cumulative Error Deprivinq Mr. Ortiz Of A Fair Trial
Under the cumulative error doctrine, the reversal of a conviction is required when
there is "'an accumulation of irregularities, each of which by itself might be harmless, but
when aggregated...show the absence of a fair trial, in contravention of the defendant's
constitutional right to due process."' State v. Field, 144 ldaho 559, 165 P.3d 273 (2007)
(quoting State v. Moore, 131 ldaho 814, 823, 965 P.2d 174, 183 (1998)). Here, even if
each of the errors by themselves were harmless, the accumulation of these errors
demonstrates that Mr. Ortiz was denied his right to a fair trial under the United States
and ldaho Constitutions. See U.S. Const. amends. VI, XIV; ldaho Const., art. I § 13.
Throughout this case, the prosecution used the total weight of the debris and
methamphetamine to demonstrate that Mr. Ortiz had to have knowledge of the
methamphetamine in his car because it was a significant amount and someone would
not likely leave this amount of methamphetamine behind in someone else's car
accidentally.

(Trial Tr., p.254, Ls.5-13, p.275, L.21

-

p.276, L.4.)

Unfortunately,

because debris was mixed in with the methamphetamine, the exact amount of
methamphetamine was not known. (Trial Tr., p.128, L.7 - p.152, L.11.) However, the
State was allowed to proceed to introduce evidence regarding the typical consumption,
packaging, and sales of methamphetamine and argued as if the amount weighed was
entirely methamphetamine. Thereby, the State gained their conviction by arguing this

was a substantial amount of methamphetamine this was when the actual weight of the
methamphetamine in this case was unknown.

Therefore, in light of these errors,

Mr. Ortiz was deprived of a fair trial and his convictions should be vacated and the case
remanded for a new trial.
CONCLUSION
Mr. Ortiz respectfully requests that his judgment of conviction be vacated and
that this case be remanded to the district court for a new trial.
DATED this lgihday of March, 2009.
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